Bank lines of credit, or revolving credit facilities, are an instrumental component of corporate liquidity management. The "Liquidity and capital resources" sections of firms' annual reports emphasize the importance of firms' access to lines of credit; likewise, research reports by credit rating agencies such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's (S&P) detail information on revolving credit facilities when discussing a firm's default risk. Despite the importance of lines of credit in the provision of liquidity in the economy, the absence of data has limited the existing empirical research on their role in corporate financing decisions. The analysis presented here represents one of the first empirical studies of lines of credit in the ongoing liquidity of public corporations.
While there is an extensive theoretical literature on bank lines of credit (Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) , Martin and Santomero (1997) ), the extant empirical literature on corporate liquidity focuses mainly on the role of cash (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , Faulkender and Wang (2006) , Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) ). The cash literature finds that cash plays an important liquidity role given that capital market frictions prevent firms from obtaining external sources of finance for valuable projects arising in the future.
The empirical finding that firms rely heavily on internal cash for liquidity is somewhat surprising, given hypotheses developed in the theoretical literature on lines of credit. This literature argues that lines of credit are motivated primarily by capital market frictions, and a committed line of credit overcomes these frictions by ensuring that funds are available for valuable projects. In other words, according to the theoretical literature, lines of credit should resolve precisely the capital market frictions that motivate firms to hold cash as a liquidity buffer. In addition, Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) and Gatev and Strahan (2006) argue that banks are the most efficient liquidity providers in the economy, which also suggests that firms should rely on lines of credit over internal cash. Despite the similarities in the literature on cash and lines of credit, there is a lack of interaction between the two areas of research. The extant literature on cash is largely silent on why firms may use cash in place of lines of credit in corporate liquidity management. This paper attempts to bridge this gap. The central question of my analysis is: What governs the use of cash versus bank lines of credit in corporate liquidity management? I attempt to answer this question using a unique data set with two sets of variables collected directly from annual 10-K SEC filings. First, for the universe of public firms in S&P's Compustat from 1996 through 2003, the data set contains information on whether a firm has access to a line of credit. Second, for a random sample of 300 firms from this universe (1,908 firm-year observations), the data set contains information on the size of the line of credit, the portion of the line of credit drawn, and the unused availability. In addition, the data set for the random sample contains information on whether firms are in compliance with or in violation of financial covenants associated with the line of credit. This data set is one of the first to contain detailed information on the use of lines of credit by a large sample of public firms.
I use this data set to explore why firms rely on cash versus lines of credit for liquidity. In the first set of results, I find evidence that maintenance of high cash flow levels is a key characteristic that governs firms' use of lines of credit relative to cash. Firms with high levels of cash flow rely on lines of credit, whereas firms with low levels of cash flow rely on cash. After controlling for firm industry, size, asset tangibility, seasonal sales patterns, market to book ratio, and age, I find that increasing lagged cash flow by 2 standard deviations at the mean increases the likelihood of obtaining a line of credit by almost 0.10 at the mean, or about one-quarter standard deviation.
Using the random sample of 300 firms which contains information on line of credit balances, I
focus on the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio. This ratio is defined as the ratio of lines of credit to the sum of lines of credit and cash; it represents the fraction of total liquidity available to the firm provided by bank lines of credit. While some firms may have higher demand for total liquidity due to seasonal product markets or better investment opportunities, this ratio isolates the relative attractiveness of lines of credit versus cash in corporate liquidity management. I find a positive effect of cash flow on the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio. More specifically, an increase in lagged cash flow by two standard deviations at the mean increases the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio by almost 0.08 at the mean, or about one-quarter standard deviation. This positive relationship is robust when I isolate the intensive margin and examine only firms that have a line of credit, although the magnitudes and statistical significance are slightly weaker.
This result suggests that maintenance of high cash flows is a critical determinant of whether a firm uses lines of credit versus cash in corporate liquidity management. When I split the sample into firms with high and low probabilities of financial distress as measured by Altman's z-score (1968) , I find that the positive relationship between the use of lines of credit and lagged cash flow is unique among firms with high financial distress likelihoods. There is no such correlation among firms with low distress likelihoods. In other words, when a firm has a significant probability of financial distress, it more heavily uses lines of credit relative to cash only if it maintains high cash flow.
What explains the positive correlation between cash flow and the use of lines of credit? In the second set of results, I explore the importance of cash-flow based financial covenants on lines of credit.
In particular, I find evidence that maintenance of cash flow is critical to avoiding financial covenant violations. Reductions in cash flow are a stronger predictor of financial covenant violations than are changes in a firm's current ratio, net worth, or market to book ratio. In addition, I find that when a firm violates a covenant, it loses access to a substantial portion of its line of credit. In terms of magnitudes, a covenant violation is associated with a 15 to 25% drop in the availability of both total and unused lines of credit. It is also associated with a 10 to 20% decrease in the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio.
This result helps explain why cash flow is an important determinant of a firm's use of lines of credit versus cash in corporate liquidity management. Given that lines of credit are contingent on maintenance of cash flow-based covenants, they represent a poor liquidity substitute for firms with low current or expected cash flows. Firms with low current or expected cash flow maintain cash balances as a liquidity buffer given that lines of credit may not be available when most needed. This result also shows that lines of credit are not totally committed liquidity insurance. The contingent lines of credit that exist in the marketplace are distinct from the committed lines of credit that are described in the theoretical literature.
In the third set of results, I provide evidence that access to lines of credit as a measure of financial constraints adds valuable information to traditional measures of constraints used in the literature.
Theoretical research suggests that lines of credit are critical in reducing future capital market frictions facing firms, yet they have not been considered in the extant literature on financial constraints. I follow Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), henceforth ACW (2004) , and examine the cash flow sensitivity of cash among firms with and without access to lines of credit. The ACW (2004) theoretical insight is that firms that face capital market frictions are likely to save cash out of cash flow, whereas firms that do not face frictions should show no systematic pattern of cash savings out of cash flow. They empirically explore the cash flow sensitivity of cash for constrained versus unconstrained firms, where they use four traditional measures of financial constraints: whether a firm is small, whether a firm has a low payout ratio, whether a firm does not have a corporate credit rating by S&P, and whether a firm does not have a commercial paper rating by S&P.
Instead of relying on these traditional measures, I explore the cash flow sensitivity of cash using a measure of constraints that relies on access to lines of credit. Theoretical research on credit lines suggests that line of credit access as a measure of financial constraints adds valuable information to traditional measures used in the literature. I define as "unconstrained" firms that have two key characteristics. First, they have a line of credit in every year in which they are in the sample. Second, they maintain cash flows scaled by book assets above the median firm throughout the sample. Firms that do not meet this criteria are designated "constrained." The empirical results using this definition show that firms without access to a line of credit save cash out of cash flow, whereas firms with access to a line of credit do not save cash out of cash flow. In addition, I show evidence that the line of credit measure is more statistically powerful at explaining the pattern of cash flow sensitivities of cash than the traditional measures used in the literature. For example, consistent with ACW (2004), firms without an S&P corporate credit rating or commercial paper rating indeed show a higher sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flow. However, among firms without access to a rating, it is only the firms without access to a line of credit that show a positive sensitivity. In general, my results show that firms that are small, have low payout ratios, or lack ratings only show positive cash flow sensitivities of cash if they lack access to a line of credit.
Overall, these results suggest that banks provide credit lines that are contingent on maintenance of cash flow. Reductions in cash flow lead to covenant violations, which in turn lead to a restriction in the availability of a line of credit. Lines of credit are therefore a poor liquidity substitute for firms that have low existing or expected cash flows. For these firms, cash is a more reliable source of liquidity.
These firms rely more heavily on cash and save more cash out of cash flow.
In addition to these results, this paper documents several new facts regarding the use of bank lines of credit by public firms. For example, I find that lines of credit are a very large and important source of corporate finance in the economy. Almost 85% of firms in my sample obtained a line of credit between 1996 and 2003, and the line of credit represents an average of 16% of book assets. I also find that lines of credit are utilized among firms that are completely equity financed; 32% of firm-year observations where no outstanding debt is recorded on the balance sheet have an available unused line of credit. Firms with access to public debt do not cease using revolving credit facilities: 95% of firm-year observations that have corporate credit rating from S&P also have a bank line of credit, and line of credit borrowings represent 12% of total debt outstanding for these firms.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, I describe lines of credit, the existing literature, the data, and summary statistics. In Section II, I describe the theoretical framework that motivates the paper. Sections III through V present the empirical analysis, and Section VI concludes.
I. Description, Existing Research, Data, and Summary Statistics

A. Description and existing research
A firm that obtains a line of credit receives a nominal amount of debt capacity against which the firm draws funds. Lines of credit, also referred to as revolving credit facilities or loan commitments, are almost always provided by banks or financing companies. They can be provided by one bank or multiple banks through syndication. The used portion of the line of credit is a debt obligation, whereas the unused portion remains off the balance sheet. In terms of pricing, the firm pays a commitment fee that is a percentage of the unused portion, and a pre-determined interest rate on any drawn amounts. Pricing and maturity data are not always available directly from annual 10-K SEC filings; in a sample of 11,758 lines of credit obtained by 4,011 public firms between 1996 and 2003 in Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan, the median commitment fee is 25 basis points, the median interest rate on drawn funds is 150 basis points above LIBOR, and the median maturity is 3 years.
Corporations detail lines of credit in their annual 10-K SEC filings. Regulation S-K of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission requires firms to discuss explicitly their liquidity, capital resources, and result of operations (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) . All firms filing with the SEC therefore provide information on the used and unused portions of bank lines of credit, and whether they are out of compliance with financial covenants. For example, Lexent Inc., a broadband technology company, details their line of credit in their FY 2000 10-K filing as follows:
At December 31, 2000, the Company had notes payable to banks aggregating $2.0 million under a $50 million collateralized revolving credit facility, which expires in November 2003. Borrowings bear interest at the prime rate or at a rate based on LIBOR, at the option of the Company. This credit facility is to be used for general corporate purposes including working capital. As of December 31, 2000, the prime rate was 9.5%.
In the 10-K filing, companies typically detail the existence of a line of credit and its availability in the liquidity and capital resources section under the management discussion, or in the financial footnotes explaining debt obligations.
Although information on credit lines is available in annual 10-K SEC filings, the existing empirical research on bank lines of credit relies on alternative data sources. Ham and Melnik (1987) collect data from a direct survey of 90 corporate treasurers. They find that draw downs on lines of credit are inversely related to interest rate cost and positively related to total sales. Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Driscoll (2004) examine the use of lines of credit for 712 privately held firms that obtained loans from FleetBoston Financial Corporation. They also find that firms with higher profitability obtain larger credit lines, which is consistent with evidence presented here. Berger and Udell (1995) use data on lines of credit extended to small private businesses and show that firms with longer banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral. Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that small private businesses without access to bank credit lines rely more heavily on trade credit. Shockley and Thakor (1997) focus on the contract structure of credit lines. While Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Houston and James (1996) This sample, which I refer to as the "full" sample, forms the basis for the text searching program described below which provides information on whether firms have a line of credit.
I then form a smaller data set based on a random sample of 300 firms, which I refer to as the "random" sample. I randomly sample 300 firms from the 4,604 firms in the full sample, and I follow them from 1996 through 2003, for a total unbalanced panel of 2,180 firm-year observations. The random sample represents 6.5% of the firms in the full sample. The random sample forms the basis for manual examination of annual 10-K SEC filings described below.
In the rest of this section, I describe the data searching process that produces measures of firms' utilization of lines of credit. It is important to understand that the process is iterative. I first use the full sample of annual 10-K SEC filings to search for certain phrases that are indicative of a firm's having a line of credit. I then use the random sample and manually read the annual 10-K SEC filings to assess whether the search terms are providing an accurate or inaccurate portrayal of the firms that have bank lines of credit. The search procedure described below is the final version of this iterative process For the full sample, I link each firm-year observation from Compustat to the electronic version of its annual 10-K SEC filing. I then search each filing for 7 terms: "credit lines," "credit facility," "revolving credit agreement," "bank credit line," "working capital facility," "lines of credit," and "line of credit." In the initial pass through the text filings, I create a variable that is 1 if the annual 10-K SEC filing has any of the search terms in the document, and 0 if the search terms are not in the 10-K filing.
This search algorithm leads to some errors in classifying whether firms in reality have a bank line of credit or revolving credit facility. In terms of classifying the errors, the null hypothesis is that the firm- In order to limit Type I errors, the search program produces a document that, for every firm-year observation, contains the 10 lines of text before and after each occurrence of a search term in the 10-K filing. Using this document, I manually search for obvious Type I errors. More specifically, I find occurrences in which one of the search terms is directly proceeded with "no," "do not have a," "not have any," "retired our," "terminated our," and "equity." I also search for the following phrases that may occur right after one of the search terms: "expired," "terminated,", and "was terminated." I manually conduct this search for Type I errors, and make sure that each is in fact a Type I error before reclassifying the firm-year observation as having no line of credit. This collection procedure results in a {0, 1} variable measuring whether or not every firm in the full sample has access to a line of credit.
For the random sample of 300 firms, I manually collect detailed data on used and unused lines of credit from annual 10-K SEC filings. It is important to emphasize that there is no search program used to collect line of credit data for the random sample; they are collected manually. I collect data on whether the firm has access to a line of credit and the used and unused portion of the line of credit. If a line of credit backs up a commercial paper program, any outstanding commercial paper is subtracted from the line of credit, but is not recorded as a used portion of the line of credit. Any balance of the back-up line of credit that does not support outstanding commercial paper is recorded as an unused part of the line of credit. This is consistent with the actual reporting done by firms. It is important to note that borrowers with a commercial paper back up line of credit draw down the portion of the line that does not back up outstanding commercial paper. Only 5 percent of firms in my sample have a commercial paper program, and all results are robust to the complete exclusion of these firms.
One advantage of the random sample data collection is that it allows me to assess directly the errors in the search program used for the full sample. In other words, by comparing the line of credit collection from manual inspection with the search program in the random sample, I am able to assess the number of Type I and Type II errors associated with the search program. I find the search program produces Type I errors in 8.6 percent of all observations in the random sample, and Type II errors in 2.2 percent of all firm-year observations in the random sample. For the random sample, I also collect data on whether or not a firm is in violation of a financial covenant associated with the line of credit; these are covenants that require the maintenance of financial ratios.
2 The SEC requires firms to report when they are in violation of a financial covenant: "companies that are, or are reasonably likely to be, in breach of such covenants must disclose material information about that breach and analyze the impact on the company if material (SEC (2003))."
Core financial variables are calculated from Compustat and are defined as follows. Book debt is short term debt plus long term debt (item 34 + item 9), all divided by total assets (item 6). Balance sheet cash is measured using item 1. A measure of asset tangibility is tangible assets (item 8) divided by noncash total assets. The market to book ratio is defined as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity less cash, all divided by non-cash total assets. The book value of equity is defined as the book value of assets (item 6) less the book value of total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 10) plus deferred taxes (item 35). The market value of equity is defined as common shares outstanding (item 25) multiplied by share price (item 199). The primary measure of cash flow is EBITDA (item 13) divided by non-cash total assets. Net worth-cash adjusted is defined as non-cash total assets less total liabilities, divided by non-cash assets.
As further described in Section III, I scale cash flow, asset tangibility, net worth, and the market to book ratio with non-cash book assets. I do so because firms are likely to jointly determine cash holdings and line of credit usage. This joint determination leads to a mechanical negative correlation between any measure scaled by total assets and the use of lines of credit. For example, suppose one constructs the measure of tangibility as tangible assets scaled by total assets. Given that cash is included in total assets, and given that firms without access to a line of credit hold higher cash balances, this classification of asset tangibility leads to a mechanical negative correlation with lines of credit. A disadvantage of using non-cash assets in place of total assets to scale cash flow and asset tangibility is that it leads to extreme outliers. In order to reduce the influence of outliers, I Winsorize all financial variables from Compustat at the 5 th and 95 th percentile.
I drop any firm-year observation for which any of the variables constructed above are missing.
The final full sample contains 4,503 firms (28,447 firm-year observations) and the final random sample contains 300 firms (1,908 firm-year observations).
C. Summary statistics
[ collected data on line of credit balances in the random sample, I construct a variety of measures to assess the magnitude of lines of credit in corporate liquidity management. On average, the total line of credit represents 16% of book assets; the unused portion represents 10% of book assets and the used portion represents 6%. Given total debt scaled by book assets is 0.21 in the random sample, this implies that used lines of credit on average represent more than a quarter of outstanding debt balances among public firms.
These statistics suggests that lines of credit are widely used by public firms, and they represent large amounts of used debt and unused debt availability.
In order to assess the importance of lines of credit in corporate liquidity management, I create two [ (2006)). Table 2 demonstrates that firms with access to public debt extensively utilize bank lines of credit. Almost 95% of firms with a corporate credit rating have access to a line of credit, and outstanding line of credit balances represent (0.245*0.190*100 =)
4.7% of total assets. Given that total debt is 38% of total assets for these firms, this implies that 12% of total debt outstanding for firms with a corporate credit rating is in the form of used lines of credit. The evidence suggests that lines of credit are an important part of debt policy even for firms that have access to public debt. Finally, the last two rows of Table 2 show that even firms that have no debt outstanding have access to lines of credit. Conditional on having no debt outstanding, 32% of firm-years have an unused line of credit available, and the unused line of credit represents 11% of total assets.
II. Theoretical Motivation
In this section, I motivate the empirical analysis by discussing the existing theoretical research in two areas: cash holdings and bank lines of credit. I focus on how an empirical analysis of lines of credit can help resolve unanswered questions in both of these areas.
ACW (2004) argue that cash holdings represent a safeguard against the inability to obtain financing when valuable opportunities arise. They build a three period model in which investment opportunities arrive in the first and second periods. Firms are either financially constrained or unconstrained; firms fall into one of these categories based on the level of cash flows and the value of collateral that the firm can pledge to creditors. In the initial period, unconstrained firms have no reason to save cash out of initial cash flows; they can reduce dividends or raise more external financing in the second period to pursue investment opportunities. Constrained firms, on the other hand, retain a portion of their first-period cash flows to "hedge" against the inability to raise external financing in the second period. The optimal level of saving out of cash flow weighs the cost of reducing investment in the first period with the benefit of more investment in the second period. Constrained firms should therefore save a higher proportion of their initial cash flows relative to unconstrained firms.
Empirical support for this framework is found in ACW (2004) and Shockley (1995) .
I focus here on two of these papers I believe demonstrate the core intuition of these models. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) motivate the use of lines of credit by embedding a moral hazard problem within a three-period model where a liquidity shock is realized in the second period. When the liquidity shock is realized in the second period, the borrower must retain a large enough portion of the third period return to motivate her to be diligent; in other words, there a standard moral hazard problem that forces the borrower to retain a large stake in the project. Given this agency problem, the first best investment level is unattainable. If the liquidity shock is large enough, the borrower will not be able to obtain funds even if the project has positive NPV, given that she must retain enough of the project return to maintain diligence. In the second best solution, the borrower buys liquidity insurance. One mechanism is a line of credit. 3 In the first period, creditors provide a commitment to lend in the second period up to a certain point. When the liquidity shock is realized, the borrower has access to committed funds. In some states of the world, the creditors end up losing money in the second period, but they break even in expectation.
This is the intuition of the liquidity insurance in the model.
Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987) also use a basic agency problem to motivate corporate demand for lines of credit. They employ a three-period model with an agency problem, where borrowers select an effort level in the first period and choose whether to invest or not in the second period. The moral hazard problem arises because the effort decision is unobservable to creditors. In the Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987) model, there is a stochastic interest rate realized in the second period that serves a role similar to that of the liquidity shock in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) . If interest rates are too high in the second period, borrowers anticipate a low expected return from the project and thus choose low effort. In other words, high interest rates in the second period lower the return to effort, which leads managers at borrowing firms to shirk. In the second period, banks fully predict such behavior, and thus ration credit.
A line of credit signed in the first period solves this problem by charging an up-front fee and guaranteeing a low rate of interest in the second period. Thus, the line of credit serves as interest rate protection which can guarantee that borrowers put in high effort initially.
According to the theoretical literature, lines of credit are committed liquidity insurance that should protect firms against future capital market frictions. In addition, Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) find that banks have natural cost advantages in the provision of liquidity given deposit-based financing.
Likewise, Gatev and Strahan (2006) find that banks are better liquidity providers given that deposits flow into banks during aggregate financial crises.
The theoretical literatures on lines of credit and banks' advantages in liquidity provision suggest that firms should rely fully on bank lines of credit in their liquidity management. This, in some sense, is the null hypothesis that is rejected by the cash literature. Clearly, lines of credit do not provide sufficient liquidity insurance for all firms in the economy. The primary goal of this paper is to resolve empirically these two research areas by exploring what determines whether firms use cash or lines of credit in corporate liquidity management. More specifically, I examine whether low cash flow, low asset tangibility, small size, low firm net worth, or low market to book ratios make lines of credit difficult to obtain and maintain. This analysis should provide insight into the precise friction that makes lines of credit a poor liquidity substitute for cash for some firms.
There are three additional hypotheses from the line of credit theoretical literature that I examine in the empirical analysis. First, the models assume that basic agency problems due to information asymmetry motivate the use of lines of credit. In other words, firms where management actions are less transparent are more likely to use lines of credit. Second, a bank line of credit must provide some degree of "commitment" if it is to improve on spot market financing. If banks can fully renegotiate the line of credit in the interim period, the contract will not improve on spot market financing. In the line of credit models described above, the optimal behavior for the bank in some states of the interim period is to restrict access to the line of credit. The empirical section of this paper attempts to quantify the extent to which lines of credit represent unconditional obligations of banks. The third main empirical hypothesis that comes from these models is that it can be difficult for firms to raise capital in spot markets when investment opportunities arrive or change. Lines of credit provide a particularly flexible source of debt financing that can be drawn upon with fewer difficulties. Lines of credit should therefore be used in industries with higher earnings or sales volatility.
III. Lines of Credit versus Cash
A. Empirical specification
In this section, I conduct estimations to examine which firm characteristics influence the decision to utilize lines of credit as opposed to cash in corporate liquidity management. There are two sets of dependent variables. First, I examine a {0,1} indicator variable for whether the firm has a line of credit.
For this dependent variable, I examine the effect of firm characteristics on the probability of having a line of credit using maximum likelihood probit estimation. Second, I examine the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio, which varies from 0 to 1. For this dependent variable, I examine the effect of firm characteristics on the ratio using linear (OLS) estimation. When I examine the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio, I also examine the intensive margin for which I isolate the sample to only firms that have a line of credit. 4 I examine the intensive margin independently to demonstrate that cash flow is positively correlated with the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio, even among firms that have a line of credit. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the firm level and all regressions include year and 1-digit SIC industry indicator variables.
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The variables in the matrix X are motivated by the theoretical framework outlined in Section II.
First, I examine firm characteristics likely to be associated with firms facing a high cost of external relative to internal finance. In other words, I attempt to explain why firms may be forced to rely on internal cash as opposed to using a bank line of credit. I use five measures. First, firm cash flow is measured as EBITDA scaled by non-cash total assets. I employ EBITDA because it is the most common measure of cash flow used by commercial banks when setting various types of covenants on lines of credit. All results are robust to a more common measure of cash flow: the sum of EBIAT and depreciation, all scaled by non-cash total assets. Second, asset tangibility is measured as tangible assets scaled by non-cash total assets. Third, firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of non-cash total assets. I also include net worth scaled by non-cash assets and the market to book ratio.
I employ non-cash total assets as opposed to total assets to scale variables. As mentioned in 
B. Results
[TABLE 3]
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report coefficient estimates from maximum likelihood probit estimation relating the probability of having a line of credit to various firm characteristics. Column 1 shows results from the full sample and column 2 shows results from the random sample. Firm cash flow has a strong positive effect on the probability a firm utilizes a line of credit. The coefficient estimate in column 2 suggests that a two standard deviation increase in cash flow (0.7) at the mean leads to an (0.7*0.124*100 =) 9% increase in the probability of obtaining a line of credit, which is almost a one quarter standard deviation increase. Consistent with evidence that high market-to-book firms use less debt generally, there is a negative correlation between the market-to-book ratio and the probability of having a line of credit. Size is also a strong statistical predictor of the use of bank lines of credit. A two standard deviation increase in the natural logarithm of total assets (4) leads to a (4*0.052*100 =) 21%
increase in the probability of obtaining a line of credit, which is more than one-half standard deviation.
In terms of business variability, the coefficient estimates in columns 1 and 2 suggest that 3-digit SIC code within-year sales volatility has a positive effect on the use of lines of credit. The effect of the sales seasonality variable would be even stronger in the absence of the 1-digit SIC industry fixed effects.
There is no statistically strong evidence that information asymmetry has an effect on the probability of utilizing a line of credit.
[
FIGURE 1]
The results in columns 1 and 2 suggest that firms with low levels of cash flow are less likely to utilize bank lines of credit. Figure 1 shows that they use cash instead. It maps both the fraction of firms that have a line of credit and the mean cash scaled by total assets across the cash flow distribution. There is strong evidence of a negative correlation of line of credit use and cash holdings across the cash flow distribution, especially at the low end. Moving from the lowest decile to the 5 th decile of cash flow leads to a monotonic increase in the probability of obtaining a line of credit from 40% to over 90%.
Alternatively, cash balances decline from over 55% of total assets to less than 10% of total assets.
Interestingly, there is an opposite trend at the very high end of the cash flow distribution in the 9 th and 10 th decile, where firms on average become less likely to use a line of credit and more likely to hold cash balances. This trend is driven by firms like Microsoft. They are much more likely to be in services industries, much less likely to use debt financing, and have much higher market to book ratios than firms in the high cash flow deciles that use lines of credit. The opposite pattern at the high end of the cash flow distribution is captured by the market to book and industry controls in the regression results, which is why they do not influence the positive effect of cash flow on line of credit utilization. The use of the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio in Table 3 also helps mitigate concerns that omitted variables correlated with a firm's demand for overall liquidity are influencing the positive correlation between line of credit usage and cash flow. The bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio isolates the relative attractiveness of lines of credit versus cash, while controlling for overall liquidity. Firms with low cash flow may have higher or lower demand for liquidity, but the important result in Table 3 is that they prefer to hold cash balances relative to lines of credit.
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One key question is whether the results in columns 3 and 5 are driven uniquely by the extensive margin. In other words, are these results robust when one examines only firms that have a line of credit?
Columns 4 and 6 suggest that, conditional on having a line of credit, firms with higher cash flow and larger firms rely more heavily on lines of credit in their liquidity management. The coefficients are weaker, both statistically and in magnitude. However, they suggest that the positive effect of cash flow on the use of lines of credit is robust when isolating only the intensive margin of use.
[TABLE 4]
There is an economically meaningful and statistically robust correlation between a firm's lagged cash flow and its use of a line of credit. Table 4 presents results that help to explain this correlation. In particular, I examine how the effect of cash flow on line of credit utilization varies across firms with high and low probabilities of financial distress. I split firms into high and low distress likelihood groups based on whether they are below or above the sample median z-score. 8 I then replicate specifications 1, 2, and 5
from Table 3 The evidence in Table 4 suggests that firms with higher distress likelihood prefer cash to lines of credit, unless they have high cash flow. In the next section, I explore how cash-flow based financial covenants may help explain this pattern of results.
IV. The Importance of Cash-Flow Based Financial Covenants
There is a robust and economically significant positive correlation between a firm's cash flow and its use of lines of credit versus cash. This correlation is particularly strong among firms with high distress Financial covenants on a line of credit require the maintenance of financial ratios. Financial ratios are specified in the initial contract, and the borrower is in default of the loan agreement if a ratio is not satisfied. These violations are referred to as "technical defaults," and the lender has the legal right to accelerate the loan in response to the violation. While most covenant violations are renegotiated, the terms of the loan can change significantly.
[ The evidence from Table 5 suggests that maintenance of cash flow is critical to avoiding non-compliance with financial covenants on lines of credit.
[TABLE 6]
Why do firms violate covenants? Unfortunately, the SEC does not require firms to disclose why they are in violation of covenants. Previous studies using data from the 1980s examine SEC filings and find evidence that net worth and current ratio covenant violations are the most common (Beneish and Press (1993) , Chen and Wei (1993) ). However, both of these studies report that large numbers of violators do not report why the violation occurs (almost 25% in Beneish and Press (1993) and almost 50%
in Chen and Wei (1993) Violation X α α β ε = + + +
In this specification, X it is a matrix that includes measures on which banks write covenants: cash flow, the leverage ratio, net worth, and the current ratio. Given the influence of size on the utilization of lines of credit, I also include firm size in X. The vector of coefficient estimates of β describes whether reductions in cash flow, reductions in net worth, increases in leverage, or decreases in current ratios lead to credit line covenant violations. The sample for the estimation of (2) includes only firm-years where a line of credit is present, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Column 1 of Table 6 shows that a drop in cash flow leads to a large increase in the probability of violating a covenant. The firm fixed effects coefficient estimate has a t-statistic above 5, where standard errors are clustered at the firm and there are 255 firms in the sample. The magnitude suggests that a firm that moves from the 90 th to the 10 th percentile of cash flow scaled by lagged assets has an increase in the probability of default of (0.32*0.58*100 = ) 19%. Considering that the mean of the left hand side variable is 11% in this sample, this represents an increase in the probability of default of 160% at the mean. Drops in cash flow strongly predict financial covenant violations.
In column 2, I include other measures on which banks place covenants. The only other variable that affects the probability of a covenant violation is the leverage ratio. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that going from the 10 th to the 90 th percentile in leverage has an increase in the probability of default of (0.47*0.59*100=) 27%, which is stronger than the effect of cash flow. However, the effect of leverage is not as statistically reliable, given that the effect is only significant at the 5% level with a tstatistic of 2.41. The t-statistic for the negative coefficient on cash flow in column 2 is -4.35. Other measures on which covenants are placed, including net worth, the current ratio, the market to book ratio, and total assets, have no statistically significant effect on the probability of a covenant violation when included with cash flow and the leverage ratio. This evidence is consistent with data from Dealscan in Table 5 : cash flow and leverage ratios are the most common component of financial covenants, and they are also the most powerful predictors of covenant violations.
[FIGURE 2]
What happens to the availability of the line of credit when a firm defaults on its covenants? Figure 2 focuses on the 90 firms in the sample that violate a financial covenant during the sample period.
It maps the total, used, and unused lines of credit to lagged total assets ratios relative to the default year.
The data are "default-time scaled" so that t=0 is the year that the firm initially defaults on a financial covenant in its credit agreement. 
V. Access to a Line of Credit and Financial Constraints
In this section, I examine whether access to a line of credit is a more statistically powerful measure of financial constraints than measures previously used in the literature. In particular, I relate my findings with the empirical findings of ACW (2004) . Their important theoretical insight, described above in Section II, is that firms facing capital market frictions are more likely to save cash out of cash flow.
They empirically examine their model by sorting a firm into financially constrained and unconstrained categories based on four measures: the payout ratio of the firm, the size of the firm, whether the firm has a bond rating, and whether it has a commercial paper rating. [ [ (2004). More specifically, the coefficient estimates presented in Table   8 are the outcome of firm fixed effects regressions relating the difference in cash holdings from t-1 to t on cash flow, a measure of investment opportunities (Q) and the natural logarithm of total assets, all measured at time t. The estimations replicate the estimations that generate results reported in Table III of ACW (2004). Each coefficient estimate in Table 8 represents the effect of cash flow on cash holdings from a separate regression for a different sub-sample.
In Panel A, I focus on the line of credit measure. Column 1 shows that firms that are constrained according to the line of credit measure save cash out of cash flow, whereas firms that are unconstrained do not save cash out of cash flow; the difference in the coefficient estimates is statistically distinct from 0 at the 1% level. The evidence is consistent with the intuition in ACW (2004): firms with access to lines of credit are less likely to face a high external cost of capital and therefore save no cash out of cash flow.
On the other hand, firms without access to a line of credit are likely to face a high external cost of capital, and therefore save cash out of cash flow. 
VI. Conclusion
Bank lines of credit, or revolving credit facilities, are an instrumental component of corporate liquidity management. Theoretical research on credit lines argues that this financial instrument should resolve future capital market frictions facing firms. Existing research also suggests that banks can provide liquidity to firms more efficiently than reliance on internal cash. However, empirical findings from the cash literature suggest that cash plays an important liquidity role for certain firms in the economy. While these two areas are related, there has been very little interaction between the two.
Extant research does not discuss why some firms utilize lines of credit while others rely on cash for liquidity. This paper attempts to bridge the gap between these two areas. In particular, I examine the factors that lead firms to utilize bank lines of credit instead of cash in corporate liquidity management.
The principal finding of the paper is that firm cash flow is a strong predictor of whether a firm There are interesting macroeconomic questions regarding how lines of credit may affect credit crunches and the transmission of monetary policy (Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Morgan (1994) 1 The relatively large number of type I errors in the full sample (8.6%) is a disadvantage of the data collection procedure. However, these errors are likely to be random. They are based only on slight variations in language used in the annual reports, and are not systematic in any way. Therefore, these errors should bias coefficients toward 0 in the regression analysis.
2 The material adverse change clause (MAC) is also an important feature in bank loan agreements. However, I find little evidence from annual 10-K SEC filings that this clause is invoked with frequency.
3 Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) emphasize that the line of credit must be irrevocable, and that the liquidity shock is verifiable. In other words, there is no possibility that borrowers misallocate the funds available under the line of credit. In addition, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) 6 This variable is constructed as follows: I use the entire set of firms with data available in the Compustat quarterly industrial files. For every firm-year, I calculate the standard deviation of the quarterly differences in sales, scaled by average assets over the year. I then obtain the median across all 3-digit SIC industries, for every given year. This variable is then merged onto each firm-year observation with the same 3-digit SIC code. This measure is similar to the earnings variance measure used in Mackie-Mason (1990) . 7 An alternative concern is that the results in Table 3 are consistent with cash balances increasing as cash flow declines, but line of credit balances remaining unchanged. In unreported results, I show that cash flow has a strong positive effect on line of credit balances scaled by non-cash assets. The evidence suggests that results in Table 3 are not solely driven by changes in cash balances. 
Table 3 Bank Lines of Credit and Firm Characteristics
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions relating the use of a line of credit to various lagged firm characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimated marginal effects (or effect of going from 0 to 1 for indicator variables) of lagged firm characteristics on the probability of having a line of credit from maximum likelihood probit estimation using the full and random sample, respectively. Columns 3 through 6 report the coefficient estimates from an OLS estimation using the random sample; the estimation relates two different measures of the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio to lagged firm characteristics. The estimation reported in columns 4 and 6 isolates the intensive margin of the bank liquidity to total liquidity ratio by focusing only on firms that have a line of credit. Regressions include year and 1-digit industry indicator variables; standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Table 6 The Causes and Consequences of Financial Covenant Violations
Columns 1 and 2 present regression coefficients from firm fixed effects regressions relating the probability of a covenant violation to firm characteristics. Columns 3 through 6 present regression coefficients from firm fixed effects regressions relating line of credit balances to a covenant violation in the previous year. The sample used for columns 1 and 2 includes only firms that have a line of credit. The sample used for columns 3 through 6 includes only firms that have a line of credit in the previous year. Regressions include year indicator variables, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Covenant This table presents correlations between various measures of financial constraints used in the literature. Line of credit takes on the value 1 if the firm (a) has access to a line of credit in every year of the sample, and (b) maintains cash flows above the median firm in every year of the sample. Bond rating and commercial paper rating take on the value 1 if the firm ever has an S&P corporate credit rating and commercial paper rating through the sample, respectively. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , which they describe in their equation (8) and Table III Total line of credit/lagged assets Used line of credit/lagged assets Unused line of credit/lagged assets
Line of credit
